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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brian Calder Kerr, (“Appellant” or “Kerr”), appeals the district court’s “Opinion on
Appeal” wherein the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s May 31, 2016 Memorandum
Decision (“Memorandum Decision”) (R., pp.17-21). Simply stated, Kerr asserts that the district
court and the magistrate court erred by concluding that under Idaho Code § 36-1303(b) an
already harvested big game animal, regardless of whether it was lawfully killed on public
ground, and where Kerr plead guilty to trespassing on private ground for the purpose of
retrieving the expired animal, was properly confiscated by the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game (“Fish and Game”). Kerr further asserts that Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) are
unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable as to Mr. Kerr.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 14, 2016, the appellant, Kerr, pled guilty to trespass to retrieve wildlife, a
misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code § 36-1603(a). (R., p.12.) Kerr admitted to entering onto
private property to retrieve a bull elk that he had lawfully killed on public ground. As part of
that plea deal, the State struck the $750.00 civil and processing penalty, mandated by Idaho Code
§ 36-1404(a) for “illegal possession” of an elk, from Kerr’s written plea agreement. At the
sentencing hearing, the State urged the Court to include in its sentence and judgment an order for
confiscation of the elk under Idaho Code § 36-1304(b). Kerr vehemently opposed the State’s
request for a confiscation order.
Following a discussion on the issue, the magistrate court granted Kerr an opportunity to
submit additional briefing on the issue. (R., pp.10-11). On April 11, 2016, Kerr submitted
1

briefing arguing that for confiscation to be appropriate, the evidence must show an unlawful
taking [and that], [h]ere it does not.” See April 11, 2016 Supplemental Brief (“Supp. Brief”), pp.
2-3. Kerr’s arguments focused on the fact that he had lawfully harvested the elk before the
trespass (and, therefore, had already “taken” the elk). Id. Kerr also argued that he did not plead
guilty to illegal or unlawful possession of the elk.
Specifically, and in support of that argument, Kerr proffered that “[t]he State did not
charge Kerr with the unlawful taking or killing of wildlife,” that “[t]he evidence presented
demonstrate[d] that Mr. Kerr lawfully took--killed the bull elk” and that this was highlighted by
the fact that “the State struck the $750.00 civil and processing penalty, mandated by Idaho Code
§ 36-1404(a) for ‘illegal possession’ of an elk, from Kerr’s written plea agreement and limited
his guilty plea to trespass. Id. Again, evidencing the fact the State was not claiming that he
unlawfully harvested or unlawfully “possessed” the elk and further evidence that he had already
“taken” the elk at the time he trespassed to retrieve the big game animal. 1 Kerr asserted that the
only bad acts alleged by the State are that Kerr unlawfully trespassed to retrieve an elk that he
lawfully harvested, i.e., “took.” Id. Significantly, the State did not respond to Kerr’s briefing.
On May 10, 2016, the Court took the matter under advisement and, on May 31, 2016, issued the
Memorandum Decision that is the subject of the present appeal. (R., pp.17-21).

1

Indeed, as pointed out in Kerr’s supplemental briefing and in the record, Kerr was properly
licensed and held the necessary tag for taking the animal. Further, his statement to law
enforcement, corroborated by an objective third party, was that he shot the elk on public land and
that it then moved into a field (private property) where it expired. See Supp. Brief, pp. 2-3;
2

Ultimately, the magistrate court rejected Kerr’s argument. The magistrate court reasoned
the State could ignore the question of whether Kerr’s harvesting of the bull elk was lawful and
that the State could merely confiscate the elk on the basis of the after-the-fact trespass with intent
to retrieve regardless of what happened prior to the trespass and regardless of whether Kerr could
“take” something that he had already “taken.” Specifically, the magistrate judge admitted that
Kerr’s legal harvesting of the bull elk was a “factual dispute [that] was not resolved by the
Court” because, in the words of the magistrate judge, “it was not necessary to Kerr’s plea of
guilty to the charge.” (R., p.18 (Memorandum Decision, p.2).) Significant for this appeal, the
magistrate judge clearly recognized the fact that the prosecutor made a calculated decision to not
“charge Kerr with illegally taking [or possessing] the elk but exercised his discretion to prosecute
[only] the trespass in order to resolve the case.” Id. However, the magistrate court did not find
that the prosecutor’s discretionary act had any pragmatic effect on whether the state could pursue
confiscation.
Ultimately, after specifically declining to make any factual determination on the question
of whether the underlying “taking” was illegal, the magistrate judge applied Idaho Code
§ 36-1404(b) to the trespass ignoring any evidence and refusing to make any finding as to
whether the underlying harvest of the elk, the first “taking” was unlawful.

(R., p.19

(Memorandum Decision, p.3).) As explained more fully below, the magistrate court’s ruling is
inconsistent and illustrates the ambiguity in the statutory language on its face or as applied to
Kerr’s acts.

3

The magistrate court pronounced that its ruling focused entirely on Kerr’s trespass
concluding that because “Kerr’s actions in trespassing were unlawful” and that because “take”
has an “expansive definition” per Idaho Code § 36-202(i), citing the “variety of ways in which
Kerr may have taken the elk,” and that Kerr’s subsequent trespass to get to the deceased elk also
constituted a taking, that Kerr’s trespass subjected the elk to confiscation.

Significantly,

however, the magistrate court indirectly recognized the problem of creating the impossible
circumstance of two “takings” and the question of whether Kerr could “unlawfully take” an
animal that he had already been “lawfully taken” per Idaho Code § 36-202(i). (R., pp.19-20
(Memorandum Decision, pp.3-4).)
The magistrate judge addressed this inconsistency i.e., impossible physics, in two ways.
First, the magistrate judge attempted to avoid the physical inconsistency and ambiguity of “two
takings” and/or “retaking from oneself” by concluding that the initial act of shooting the elk was
not, by itself, a separate act of taking. Rather, the magistrate judge reasoned that “it was in the
very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for his
trespass, Kerr never possessed the elk.” (R., p.20 (Memorandum Decision, p.4).) As explained
below, this is inconsistent with the plain language of Sections 36-1404(b) and 36-202(i) and with
Kerr’s plea. And, to the extent this is the basis for the magistrate court’s ruling, it is irreversible
error in the application of the statute.
Second, in what seems inconsistent with any attempt to address the impossible physics of
taking something already taken, the magistrate court reasoned that the physical impossibility of
two takings did not matter: “Under the broad definition of ‘take’ it is also true that Kerr did a
4

taking when he shot or killed the elk. The fact that he took the elk by shooting it (perhaps prior
to trespassing if his account is to be believed) does nothing to diminish or wash away the taint of
the [second] taking Kerr engaged in when he trespassed to possess the elk.”

(R., p.20

(Memorandum Decision, p.4).) Here, the magistrate judge appears to be saying that per the
statute there could be multiple “takings” even if physically impossible, and that as long as one of
the “takings” is illegal, the animal is subject to confiscation.
Ultimately, based on one reasoning or the other, the magistrate court concluded: “Kerr
could not possess th[e] elk without committing the illegal act of trespass [and] [a]ccordingly,
under I.C. § 36-1304(b), the elk shall remain confiscated by the Department of Fish and Game,
and Kerr’s request to reconsider [the confiscation] is denied.” (R., pp.21-22 (Memorandum
Decision, p.5-6).) And, indeed, it is this determination that is the foundation of the present
appeal and that Kerr submits is a misapplication of the law and the basis for claiming the
statutory scheme is unconstitutionally ambiguous and vague.
Kerr appealed the magistrate court’s ruling. And, on July 12, 2016, Kerr filed a notice of
appeal, asserting two issues on appeal: 1) did the magistrate court misapply Idaho Code § 361304(b) and § 36-202(i) and 2) are “Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) unconstitutionally
vague and unenforceable as to Mr. Kerr?” (R., pp.44-46).
Following briefing on these issues, Judge Scott, district court judge for the Fourth
Judicial District, heard oral argument. On that same day, December 19, 2017, the district court
issued its Opinion on Appeal. (R., pp.35-42). In that ruling, the district court acknowledged
Kerr’s argument that the statute allowed for a physical impossibility--“taking” an animal
5

multiple times: “[Kerr’s] principal argument is that, by shooting the elk lawfully, he ‘took’ it
lawfully, and because the same elk logically can’t be ‘taken’ twice, the elk he shot wasn’t ‘taken’
again when he unlawfully gained possession of it by trespassing on cultivated private land to
retrieve it.” (R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p.5).) And, like the magistrate judge below, the
district court appreciated the confusion that attaches to Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i)
when trying to understand what constitutes a taking under Idaho fish and game law:
As already noted, “take” is a statutorily defined term. Its meaning is very broad
and isn’t synonymous with “kill” (though that is one way to “take” an elk). I.C. §
36-202(i). Of course an elk can’t be killed more than once. But, given the
statutory definition of “take,” the same elk can be “taken” multiple times. Indeed,
Kerr first “took” the elk by “hunting” it, even before he shot it. See I.C. § 36202(i) (providing that to “hunt” is to “take”); I.C. § 36-202(j) (defining “hunting”
essentially as trying to capture or kill wildlife, whether successful or not). He
may well have “taken” the elk a second time by “pursuing” it (if it happened to
have been necessary for him to pursue the elk after seeing it but before shooting
it). Then he “took” it another time by “shooting” it, perhaps another time by
“killing” it (if shooting it alone weren’t enough to cause its death), and still
another time by “pursuing” the dying elk on cultivated private land. Finally, he
“took” the elk by “possession” it.
(R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p. 5).)
Regardless of this appreciation, the district court ultimate agreed with the magistrate
judge and concluded that “[b]y his own admission, Kerr acted unlawfully in gaining possession
of the elk he shot” and that “the magistrate’s decision was correct and Kerr’s appeal fails” for
this reason alone. (R., p.38 Opinion on Appeal, p.4 (emphasis added).)
As set forth more fully below, the district court’s focus on “possession” as the basis for
upholding the magistrate court’s ruling fails to appreciate circumstances of this case and ignores
the construction problems for both “take” and “possession.” Significantly, as set forth below,
6

“possession” is included in the definition of “take.” See Idaho Code § 36-202(i). Thus, if you
“possess” wildlife, you are deemed to have “taken” wildlife, or in this case “re-taken” wildlife.
Perhaps even more significant, the district court ignored that fact that as part of his plea deal, the
prosecutor struck the $750.00 civil and processing penalty, mandated by Idaho Code § 361404(a) for ‘illegal possession’ of an elk, from Kerr’s written plea agreement”--a tacit
acknowledgement by the State that Ker’s wrong doing was limited to the act of “trespass” and
had nothing to do with “possession.” Stated differently, for purposes of application, the State
cannot enter a plea deal that focuses on “trespass” and that for the purposes of conviction
removes “illegal possession” and then bootstrap in the alleged “illegal possession” after-the-fact
because “possession” is one of the definitions of “take” under the confiscation statute. As
explained below, this interpretation is a flawed and requires an illogical and nonsensical
application of statutory language. Moreover, this nonsensical application makes the already
ambiguous and vague statutory scheme even more ambiguous and vague and is another basis for
concluding that the statutes when read in concert are not constitutionally sound.

7

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are as follows:
I.

Is Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), read together with the definition provided in

Idaho Code § 36-202(i), unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable?
II.

Did the Magistrate Court misapply Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), where there

was no finding that the Appellant took game illegally (or illegally possessed game) prior
to the trespass?

8

ARGUMENT
I.

Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) And § 36-202(i) Are Impermissibly Vague On Their Face And
Vague As Applied To The Facts Of This Case
A.

Introduction

The void for vagueness doctrine is an aspect of due process requiring the meaning of a
criminal statute be determinable. See State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246
(1998) (citing Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984)). Due process requires
that all “be informed as to what the State commands or forbids” and that “men of common
intelligence” not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Id. (citing Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). Accordingly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, premised
upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a statute defining
criminal conduct or imposing civil sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must be worded
in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497–99 (1982); State v.
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34,
218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2009). “Thus, a statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the
statute.” Burton v. State, Dep't of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (Ct. App.
2010). “A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a

9

complainant's conduct.” Id. Here, the statute is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as
applied to the facts of his case.
B.

Standard Of Review

In an appeal from a final judgment of a magistrate court following an appeal to a district
court sitting as an appellate court, subsequent appellate courts review the record of the magistrate
court independently of the decision of the district court. State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 628, 67
P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003).
The standard of review applicable to constitutional challenges on appeal is one of
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of whether
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found. See State v. Julian, 129
Idaho 133, 135, 922 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1996). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240,
244, 999 P.2d 895, 899 (2000).
C.

The Question Of Vagueness Was Raised Below As Evidenced By The Magistrate
Court’s Memorandum Decision And, Even If It Was Not, The Issue Can Be
Considered On Appeal

As a threshold matter, Kerr addresses the issue of whether this issue is properly before
this Court on appeal. Although this Court exercises free review, Kerr appreciates that the district
court claimed that Kerr “simply didn’t raise [the void for vagueness argument] in front of the
magistrate” and, accordingly, refused to address the merits of the argument. Directly stated, Kerr
asserts that the district court is mistaken and directs this Court to the language of the May 31,
2016 Memorandum Decision. Indeed, the magistrate court acknowledged that “Kerr’s other
10

argument” was whether “the Legislature did not specifically detail the application of I.C. § 361304(b)….” (See R., p.21 (Memorandum Decision, p. 5).) Whether the Idaho Legislature erred
by not providing specific detail for the application of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) is a void for
vagueness argument.

Accordingly, the issue was raised below, and the district court’s

determination that the issue was not raised below is without basis.
Even if the issue was not raised below, the void for vagueness issue could have been
raised by the district court and can be addressed by this Court now. It is well-established that
Idaho appellate courts consider a claim of error to which no objection was made below if the
issue presented rises to the level of fundamental error. See e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an
appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to error when the defendant persuades the court that
the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2)
is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in
the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 221, 245 P.3d at
978. Thus, here, even if Kerr failed to raise “vagueness” below, the failure constitutes
fundamental error because it violates an unwaived constitutional right (Due Process), the error is
clear and obvious from the record with no need of additional information, and there can be no
question that the alleged error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Significantly, the district
court claimed that the “constitutional right” was waived, because “Kerr failed to argue before the
magistrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.” (R., p.42 (Opinion on
11

Appeal, p.8).) This reasoning makes no sense.

If a criminal defendant “waives” his

constitutional rights by not raising them at the trial court level, then there would be no basis for
the “fundamental error doctrine” because no criminal defendant could overcome the first prong
of the test--showing that the error he did not raise below was not raised. Moreover, that
approach is not supported by case law.
In State v. Black, 1999 Lexus ES300, 45 Kan. App. 2d 168, 175–76, 244 P.3d 1274, 1280
(2011), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the same issue. In that case, the appellant asserted
that a Kansas forfeiture statute “is unconstitutionally vague” claiming that “the statute does not
provide explicit standards for the court to use when deciding whether the forfeiture was grossly
disproportionate.” Id. Significantly, the state argued that the appellate “court should not consider
the issue since [Appellant] is raising it for the first time on appeal…” The Kansas high court
rejected the argument because it concluded that the “vagueness argument addresses [appellant’s]
due-process rights, so he has met an exception to the general rule, and this court can decide the
issue.” Id. Similarly, here, regardless of whether Kerr raised the issue below, the issue of
whether Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202(i) are vague is properly before this Court. As in
Black, the claim involves Kerr’s unwaived rights of Due Process, the claim of error is clear
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, and, finally, the claim of error incontrovertibly affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings--here the sentencing.

12

D.

Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) And § 36-202(i) Are Vague Because They Fail To
Provide Fair Notice That Kerr’s Bad Act Of Trespassing Combined With His
Prior Lawful Acts Subjected The Elk To Confiscation

To prove vagueness, Kerr must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that his
conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that law enforcement had
unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge him. See, e.g., Martin, 148 Idaho at 35,
218 P.3d at 14; Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 P.3d at 935. Here, that after Kerr had lawfully
taken and possessed an elk, whether his subsequent trespass, subjected him to the confiscation
statute. The following addressing the statute’s failure to provide fair notice to Kerr that his
trespass would result in the confiscation.
The statute at issue states as follows:
B. Unlawfully Taken Wildlife--Seizure, Confiscation, Disposition.
(i)

The director or any other officer empowered to enforce the fish
and game laws may at any time seize and take into his custody any
wildlife or any portion thereof which may have been taken
unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the possession of any
person. If it appears from the evidence before the magistrate
hearing the case that said wildlife was unlawfully taken, the
magistrate shall:
(2)

Order the same confiscated or sold by the director
and the proceeds deposited in the fish and game
account….

See Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).
Idaho Code § 36-202 definitions applicable to Section 36-1304(b) and as to the term
“take” provides as follows:
(i) “Take” means hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill,
or possess or any attempt to so do.
13

See Idaho Code § 36-202(i).
Here, the initial question is whether the statute provides fair notice in light of the conduct
at issue. Significantly, there can be no real debate that when Kerr shot the elk, per the definition
above, he “took” the elk. And, indeed, if that “take” had been unlawful, it is conceded that
confiscation would have been proper and that Kerr, again, per the language of the statute, would
have had fair notice. However, Kerr was not charged with and did not plead to that charge. Kerr
pled to Idaho Code § 36-1603 (“Trespassing on cultivated lands”). That code section states that,
“No person shall enter the real property of another…for the purpose of hunting, retrieving
wildlife, fishing or trapping, without the permission of the owner or person in charge of the
property….” Idaho Code § 36-1603.
Here, Kerr pled guilty to trespassing for the purpose of retrieving wildlife (an elk) that,
pursuant to the plain language of the statute, he had already lawfully taken. The State confirmed
that understanding when it: 1) the State did not charge Kerr with the “unlawful taking or killing
of wildlife” and 2) struck the civil penalties associated with “illegal possession” of a big game
animal from Kerr’s written plea agreement. Given this understanding--that Kerr was not being
prosecuted for “illegal possession,”--a fact not appreciated by the district court--and where the
statute makes clear that Kerr lawfully “took” the elk when he shot and killed the elk, it is simply
not reasonable to believe that Kerr had the requisite notice to believe he, or anyone else that
lawfully harvests an animal that unfortunately happened to die on private property, would be
subject to confiscation if they trespassed to get to the animal and pled guilty to a trespass. And,
indeed, if Kerr has not trespassed, Kerr would have been subject to other fish and game statutory
14

violations including “waste”: Idaho Code § 36-1202 makes it illegal to “fail to properly dress and
care for any game animal killed” and to “to fail to take or transport [edible portions] to [the
hunter’s] camp within twenty-four hours.” See Idaho Code § 36-1202(c) and (c)(2).
Again, the statute gives authority to confiscate “wildlife or any portion thereof which
may have been taken unlawfully.”

See Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).

In this case, it is

incontrovertible fact that Kerr had already lawfully “taken” the animal. Thus, it is not reasonable
for him to believe that he could be penalized for what would have to be a second “taking.” In the
words of the Idaho Court of Appeals, “[p]ersons of ordinary intelligence can only guess at the
statute’s directive in this circumstance.” See Burton, 149 Idaho 746 at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.
Accordingly, the statute is ambiguous and fails to provide requisite notice.
This ambiguity is highlighted by the magistrate judge’s ruling attempting to apply this
vague and ambiguous statutory scheme. Indeed, the magistrate court concedes that per the
statute, the initial legal harvesting of the animal, constituted a legal “taking.” See Memorandum
Decision, p. 4 (“Under the broad definition of ‘take’ it is also true that Kerr did a taking when he
shot or killed the elk.”). And, indeed, the magistrate court clearly struggled with the practical
impossibility of a person “taking” and “retaking” from himself. Consequently, here, if the legal
applicability of the statute is difficult for the learned magistrate judge, the language clearly “fails
to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence.” See Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240
P.3d at 935. Similarly, district court’s attempt at application reveals the same thing--attempting
to explain how a hunter “takes” an elk, the district court provides this unreasonable and
unhelpful explanation based on the statutory language: The hunter can first “take” the “elk ‘by
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hunting’ it, even before he shot it” … “[h]e may well have ‘taken’ the elk a second time by
‘pursing’ it (if it happened to have been necessary for him to pursue the elk after seeing it before
shooting it)”…. and that he “‘took’ it another time by “shooting” it, perhaps another time by
‘killing’ it (if shooting it alone weren’t enough to cause its death), and still another time by
“pursing” the dying elk onto cultivated private land.” (R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p. 5).) This
is not the type of nonsensical legal-connect-the-dots meta-physical hypothetical that people of
ordinary intelligence should be expected to parse.
E.

Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) Is Unconstitutionally Vague Because It Allows For
Arbitrary And Discriminatory Enforcement

Per, United States Supreme Court legal precedent, the void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires a statute to be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497–99. Here, as highlighted by
Kerr’s situation, the very language of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) allows for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement because the confiscation statute and related definitions are so broad
and inclusive that they included virtually any wrongful act associated with big game hunting.
Indeed, the reasoning of the magistrate court and district court, taken to its logical end, means
that any wrongful act, regardless of how minor, committed by any individual involved in the
activity of hunting or trapping, would subject the malfeasor in possession of a legally harvested
animal subject to confiscation.
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II.

The Magistrate Court Erred In Its Application Of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b)
A.

Introduction

The magistrate court erred in its application of the confiscation statute to the facts of this
case and the plea deal. Significantly, the magistrate court indirectly recognized the problem of
creating the impossible circumstance of two “takings” and the question of whether Kerr could
“unlawfully take” an animal that he had already “lawfully taken” per Idaho Code § 36-202(i).
The magistrate judge addressed this inconsistency in two ways, first, by concluding that the
initial act of shooting the elk was not, by itself, a separate act of taking, that but rather “it was in
the very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for
his trespass, Kerr never possessed the elk.” Id. at p. 4. This is plainly inconsistent with the
language of Sections 36-1404(b) and 36-202(i). Second, the magistrate court concluded that
there were two takings of the same animal and that because the second “retaking” was illegal,
confiscation for the second taking was permissible under the statute. This application is also
erroneous and is a basis for reversal.
B.

Standard Of Review

As set forth above, Idaho courts acting in appellate capacity exercise free review over
questions of statutory interpretation and application. See Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149
Idaho 9, 15, 232 P.3d 330, 336 (2010) (citations omitted).
On review, “[a]n unambiguous statute must be given its plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning. Statutory provisions should not be read in isolation but instead are interpreted in the
context of the entire document.”

Id.

Here, in the event that this Court finds the statute
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unambiguous, Kerr asserts the magistrate court and district court erred in their application of
Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).
C.

The Magistrate Court’s Conclusion That Shooting And Killing Of The Elk Was
Not A Taking Is Inconsistent With The Plain Language Of The Statute

Simply stated, the magistrate judge erred by concluding that the initial act of shooting the
elk was not, by itself, a separate act of taking, that but rather “was in the very act of trespassing
that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for his trespass, Kerr never
possessed the elk.” Id. at p. 4. This is inconsistent with the plain language of Sections 361404(b) and 36-202(i) and ignores Title 36 taken as a whole. Idaho Code § 36-202(i) defines
“take” as “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill or possess or any attempt to
do so.” These broad definitions mean that Kerr’s act of shooting and killing the elk was,
unquestionably an act of taking. The magistrate court’s conclusion is, therefore, erroneous. 2
Significantly, the district court avoided this argument--an admission that the argument
lacks merit. Indeed, the district court recognized the impossibility, but concluded that any prior
“taking” did not matter regardless of any impossibility because, ultimately, Kerr was in illegally
possession of the elk and that this justified confiscation under the statute.

As explained

immediately below, this argument adopted by both the magistrate court and the district court also
fails.
2

In fairness to the magistrate court, he was asked to do the impossible, interpret an ambiguous
statute that requires a ruling that is “physically inconsistent.” And, it should be noted the
magistrate court appears to reject its own argument--that there was only one taking that was not
completed until Kerr committed the trespass. (See R., p.20 (Memorandum Decision, p.4).)
(“Under the broad definition of ‘take’ it is also true that Kerr did a taking when he shot or killed
the elk.”).
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D.

The Conclusion That There Were Two Takings That Resulted In An Illegal
Possession That Authorized Confiscation Is Erroneous

The magistrate judge gave a second basis for its application of the confiscation statute:
“The fact that he [Kerr] took the elk by shooting it (perhaps prior to trespassing if his account is
to be believed) does nothing to diminish or wash away the taint of the [second] taking Kerr
engaged in when he trespassed to possess the elk.” (R., p.20 (Memorandum Decision, p.4).) In
essence, the magistrate judge appears to be saying that per the statute there could be multiple
“physical takings” and that as long as Kerr committed the illegal act of trespass to retrieve, the
animal is subject to confiscation. It is this analysis that was adopted by the district court as well:
“The fundamental problem with [Kerr’s] argument is that nothing in the stature suggests an elk
can only be ‘taken’ once.” (R., p.39 (Opinion on Appeal, p.5).)
As explained above, to the extent that this is the meaning of the language of the statute,
the statute is ambiguous and fails to provide adequate notice. Regardless, to the extent this is the
lower courts’ interpretation of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-202, it is erroneous. A review
of the statutory language of Title 36 clearly shows that the legislature did not intend for the
unlawful taking penalties to be read into the “trespass to retrieve” statute. Throughout Title 36,
the legislature treated “unlawful taking” and “unlawful possession” much differently than
“trespass to retrieve” and, accordingly, outlined specific penalties associated with those crimes.
For example, the unlawful taking violation has detailed penalties associated with it, like possible
felony conviction (Idaho Code § 36-1401(c)(3)), confiscation (Idaho Code § 36-1304(b)), and
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civil monetary penalties (Idaho Code § 36-1404(a)). The trespass to retrieve statute does not
have these additional penalties and is outlined as a simple misdemeanor.
If the legislature intended for trespass violations to have the same penalties as unlawful
taking (i.e., confiscation and mandatory civil penalty), it could have done so, but it expressly
declined. However, the legislature did outline specific penalties for other types of trespassing
violations. See Idaho Code § 36-1402(e) (imposing mandatory hunting and fishing license
revocation for “[t]respassing in violation of warning signs or failing to depart real property of
another after notification”). By expressly excluding trespass to retrieve violations from enhanced
penalties associated with unlawful taking or possession and failing to detail the application of the
confiscation statute to “trespass to retrieve” violations, the Idaho Legislature obviously intended
or at least created the possibility to exclude “trespass to retrieve” as an “unlawful taking” or
“unlawful possession” for the purpose of confiscation. See State v. Schoger, 148 Idaho 622, 629,
226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (stating the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another under
the statutory construction principle of inclusio unio est alterius). And, in this case, this is
significant because the State, as part of the plea deal, removed the taint of “illegal possession”
when it struck the charge and removed all fines and penalties associated with “illegal
possession.” Thus, here, there is only a trespass, and there are no facts to support an illegal
possession or an illegal taking.
In short, the statutes at issue taken as a whole and applied to the facts of this case do not
support the isolated reading and application decided upon by the magistrate court. Accordingly,
Kerr asserts the magistrate court committed reversible error.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Kerr respectfully requests this Court reverse the
magistrate court’s order denying the State’s request for an order of confiscation.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2017.
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